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Summary
This paper revisits the long-standing issue of the incidence of
taxes in developing  countries.  Its central  theme is that  despite many
decades  of  studies,  tax  incidence  analysis  for  developing  countries
continue to be based upon the same shifting assumptions used in developed
country studies, despite some obvious pitfalls.  Taxes are assumed to be
shifted forward to consumers, or backwards onto factor incomes, as  has been
the case for developed country tax incidence  work from Bowley and Stamp to
Pechman and Okner.  Developing countries typically have a much different
non-tax policy and regulatory environment from develored countries, with
higher  protection,  rationed  foreign  exchange,  price  controls,  black
markets, credit rationing and many other features.  The paper argues that
all these features can greatly complicate and even obscure the incidence
effects  relative  to  conventional thinking and by  substantial orders  of
magnitude.
An  example  is  the  appropriate  shifting  assumption  to  use  in
analysis of incidence of trade taxes, and, in particular, tariffs.  In many
developing countries this depends upon whether or not quotas are present,
and, in turr.,  whether  they are binding.  Because they are a significant
revenue  source  in  lower  income  developing  countries, whether  they are
treated as  lump sum taxes borne by recipients of rents  from quotas,  or
passed  for-  ard  to  consumers  in  higher  prices  dramatically  affects  the
conclusion  of  any  incidence analysis  of  such taxes.  An  assumption of- ii  -
forward shifting il.  lies that tariffs are treated in a similar  way to sales
taxes  in  developed  country  analysis  and  hence  tend  to  be  viewed  as
regressive.  In contrast, an assumption that tariffs are born by recipients
of quota rents, because of quota quantity constraints, tends to make such
taxes appear progressive since rights to quota are usually allocated to
higher income grcups.  Another example ie the incidence of a sales tax in
the presence  of  black  markets  when  legal  pass  forward  of  the  tax  is
permitted.  The  effect of  a  forward shifted tax may be  to divert more
expenditures  onto  the  black  market,  drive up black market  prices,  and
shorten  the  length  of  queues  on  white  markets.  Since  the  rich  are
frequently alleged to transact more heavily on black markets, these second
round effects will  shift proportionately more of the burden of such taxes
onto the rich.  Also, incidence effects of the value-added tax (VAT) are
clearly affected by the role of price and quantity controls  through the
trade component of the tax.  In the presence of quantity controls through
import  licensing,  a VAT  may  simply  take away rents  from  recipients of
quota, through the trade component of the VAT.  And if these are wealthier
individuals, then this can have a significant  progressive incidence impact.
Incidence analysis of the corporate tax can also be affected by
special developing country considerations.  Corporate taxes paid by foreign
companies in many instances can be written off against their domestic tax
liabilities, and  the tax  in these cases will  largely be paid by  foreign
treasuries  with no direct incidence effects in the host developing country.
In  addition  many  developing  country  manufacturing  and  distribution
corporations are heavily or wholly government owned.  Taxes paid by these
corporations represent an internal transfer of funds  with no redistributive
implications.  Furthermore, if there is credit rationing, the corporate tax- iii -
will primarily  take  rents  away from  those  who qualify  for  rationed  credit.
Incidence analysis  of personal  income  taxes is also complicated  by tax
evasion  and  urban-rural  migration  responses. Once these  factors  are  taken
into consideration,  progressivity  of the personal  income  tax may not be
sustained.  In general capturing non-tax policy features in analysis
challenges  conventional  wisdom  on tax  incidence.
T'Le  paper  develops  a "new"  view  of the  incidence  of  major  existKng
taxes  by incorporating  key developing  country  features  into its analyses.
The challenge  to existing  perceptions  which permeate  policy  in this  area,
is  best  illustrated  by considering  what one  might  term  a stylized  Bank/Fund
package  of tax reforms.  Such reformF  consist  largely  of four separate
components: (1)  a general  move  towar4 reduction  of trade  taxes  (and  trade
liberalization  in general);  (2) an emphasis  on movement  away from trade
taxes  and  towards  a broad  based  sales  taxes  of the  value-added  type;  (3)  a
reduction  in personal  tax rates  and consolidation  of number  of brackets;
and (4) a reduction  in corporate  tax rates  with special incentives  for
inward  foreign  investment.
A  traditional  analysis  of the incidence  effects  of such  a package
wou2l  be along  the  following  lines. Reductions  in  personal  tax  rates  would
tend to be somewhat regressive,  and if the corporate  tax is borne by
capital and capital is more  heavily owned by higher income groups,
reductions  in corporate  taxes  would also tend to be regressive.  Trade
taxes  and  value-added  taxes  are  both  indirect  taxes  of a consumption  type,
and an increase  in them also tends  to be regressive. This  whole  package,
therefore,  would tend to be seen as a move towards  a  more regressive  tax
regime,  about  which  there  could  be substantial  agonizing  in  policy  making.
Under the alternative  view of the world  which emerges  from this
paper,  it  seems  equally  defensible  to suggest  that  the  value-added  tax  is  a- iv  -
progressive  rather  than  a re,-essive  tax as its trade  component  falls  on
rents  acquired  by import  license  holders,  that portions  of the corporate
tax in various  countries  are borne  by for&'ign  treasuries  rather  than by
domestic  capital,  that reductions  in personal  taxes  can have substantial
incidence  effects  in the opposite  direction  because  of the weakening  in
problems of evasion and  administration  ultimately reducing transfers
through  a system  of bribery  and  corruption  to  high  income  groups. Thus  the
incidence  effects  of each of these  taxes  could  well be quite  opposite  to
the  conventional  wisdom  asserted  repeatedly  in  developing  country  incidence
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I.  Introduction
This paper  revisits the long-standing issue of the incidence of
taxes  in developing  countries  (see  Bird  and  de Wulf (1973),  de Wulf (1975)
and McLure (1977)  for earlier  discussions). Tax incidence  analyses  thus
far performed  for  developing  countries  largely  involve mechanical
replication of  conventional developed country analyses.1  This tradition
continues  to be  followed  even  though  developed  country  tax  incidence
results have, themselves, been challenged in a number of important ways in
recent years.  The paper comments on the userulness of results of  such
analyses, particularly  when evaluating incidence effects accompanying  wider
structural reforms in developing country tax systems.
Many  potential  pitfalls  arise  in  applyir-  developed  country
incidence techniques to developing countries.  Those stressed here largely
arise from interactions between tax policie; and non-tax features of the
policy  and regulatory environment including, protection, rationed foreign
exchange, price controls and black markets, and credit rationing.
The  paper  provides  several  illustrations  as to  how misleading
conclusions can be drawn from studies that ignore these developing country
features.  Their incorporation can sometimes reverse the incidence pattern
of taxes relative to what is often tahen to be conventional wisdom, and
*  Earlier versions of this paper were presented at a seminar at the World
Bank  in  July  1989 and  the World  Bank  Conference  on Tax  Policy  in
Developing  Countries  in  March  1990.  We  are  grateful  to  Javad
Khalilzadeh-Shirazi,  Richard Musgrave,  Charles McLure,  Richard  Bird,
Bela Balassa and Nicholas Stern for comments and to Jaber Ehdaie and
John Brondolo for assistance in preparing the tables in  Appendix A.-2-
even  where reversals  of pattern  do not occur  quantitative  differences  can
be major.  A  concluding section of the paper discusses some of the
implications  of some of the "newer"  viewa of incidence  emerging  from the
paper  for tax  restructuring  options  under  discussion  in several  developing
countries.
II.  Tax  Incidence  Analysis  for  DeveloRed  Countries
The studies  of the redistributive  effects  of taxes in developed
countries  on  which  comparable  studies  in developing  countries  are  based  all
involve  numerical  calculations  of annual  tax  incidence. 2 They  make  various
assumptions  as to how components of the tax system are shifted onto
consumers,  producers,  factor  owners,  and other groups,  typically  focusing
on five  key tax  groups:  income,  corporate,  sales  and  excise,  property  and
social  security  taxes. Each is treated  as having  sources  and/or  uses side
effects,  which reflect  how  any given  tax  is assumed  to be either  partly  or
fully  borne by one or more elements  of income  on the caurces  side (i.e.
capital  income,,  labor  income  and transfers),  or by households  on the  uses
side (i.e. according to the way they spend their income,  reflected  in
savings and expenditure  patterns  by household).  In the literature  the
terms  'shifting  assumptions',  'incidence  assumptions'  and 'sources  and  uses
sides  effects'  all  refer  to these  treatments  adopted  for  the  allocation  of
tax burdens.  These terms are used interchangeably  here  although  we
predominantly  use the  term  'shifting  assumption'
Three  main income  sources  are  assumed  to bear the  burden  of taxes
in these studies:  capital  income,  labor income  and  transfers.  In annual
data, transfers  are  heavily  concentrated  in the lower  tail of the incomedistribution,  capital  income  in both the upper and lower  tails (owing  to
the  presence of retirees),  while labor income  is closest of the three
series  to being  proportional  to income. Thus,  depending  upon whether  the
sources side effects of a tax are allocated to capital income, labor
income,  transfers,  or to income  in general,  a progressive  or regressive
effect can result.  On the uses side the key feature is differential
savir.gs  rates by income range.  S4.nce  around 40 percent of household
savings  are concentrated  in the top  10 percent  of the income  distribution,
taxes that are treated  as borne by consumers  of taxed products  produce
regressive  incidence  effects. 3
Thus, the sources  and uses effects  of taxes appearing  in these
incidence  calculations  reflect  their  allocation  to the  various  components
of  annual  household  budget  constraints,  written  for  simplicity  as
(1)  C +  S - K  + L + Tr - PT
where C and S denote  cons_mption  and savings  respectively,  and K, L, Tr,
and PT are  capital  and labor  income,  transfers,  and personal  taxes.  Uses
side effects  of taxes  across  househol.s  primarily  arise  as consumption  to
savings  ratios  differ  by household. Sources  side effects  arise  where the
composition  of income  is  different  by income  range.
Incidence est-Amates  for whole  tax systems reflect separate
incidence  calculations  by income  range  for  each  tax,  which  are then  summed
across  taxes.  '  combination,  they yield  an average  total  tax rate for
each income  range. The extent  of redistribution  through  the  tax  system  is
evaluated  by examining  the pattern  of average  tax rates  by income  range.
It is widely agreed that net redistribution  involving  expenditures  andtaxes  may be of more interest  than tax incidence  alone,  and that lifetime
rether than annual incidence calculations should form the basis for
evaluating tax reform initiatives,  but dsta limit&tions  are frequently
cited  as reasons  why they  are  not  made. 4
As usually  summarized  in public  finance  texts  and other sources,
the  major  finding  from  these  studies  is that  the  tax system  does little  to
redistribute  income.  One widely  cited set of incidence  calculations  are
those due to Pechman  and Okner (1974)  for the U.S.  They use a detailed
merged  1966  data  file  of  approximately  87,000  income  tax  returns  and  30,000
households  in a  U.S. Survey  of Economic  Opportunity  data  file. Alternative
incidence  calculations  are  made reflecting  different  shifting  assumptions.
They conclude  that regressive  and  progressive  taxes  in the  U.S. tax  system
roughly offset each other, and furthermore  that this finding is little
affected by the choice  of shifting  assumption  used in the calculation.
This Pechman-Okner  conclusion,  often referred  to as the "ProportionaLity
Hypothesis",  is widely cited and has been a major element  in tax reform
debates  in the United  States  and elsewhere. The same theme  also emerges
from  reaults  of other  developed  country  incidence  studies.
The conclusions  from this  work, while  regarded  as the  mainst:eam
view of developed  country  tax incidence,  have nonetheless  also been the
subject  of much controversy  and debate  i  -ecent  years.  Gillespie 1980)
in  work on Canada,  for  instance,  reachea  the  conclusion  that  the  tax  system
is 'regressive  over the upper  income  classes'  (p.170). In reaching  these
conclusions,  he stresses  net fiscal  incidence  (the  value of benefits  from
government  expenditures,  less  the taxes  borne  by income  range)  rather  than
simply  tax incidence.  In his tax incidence  analysis,  he largely  limits
himself to a single set of shifting  assumptions  but importantly  uses a. 5  -
different  income  concept  from  Pechman-Okner.  The  exclusion  of transfers  in
the  income  concept  is a  major  factor  underlying  his results.
Browning  (1978)  and Browning  and Johnson  (1979),  are critical  of
Pechman-Okner  proportionality  hypothesis  in the other direction,  arguing
that the tax system  should  be viewed  as progressive. The  main difference
in their  work relative  to Pechman-Okner  lies in their treatment  of sales
and  excise  taxes  and  in the  income  concept  they  use. 5 Browning  and  Johnson
arSue  that uses side effects  due to differential  savings  rates  by income
range largely  d.sa,pear  when savings  out of lifetime  rather  than annual
income  are considered. They therefore  only consider  sources  side effects
of indirect  taxes.  Furthermore,  they  point out that since  transfers  are
largely  indexed  for  chan&es  in  the  price  level  only  factor  incomes  can  bear
the burien of  indirect taxes passed forward as higher prices.  The
c- centration  of transfers  in  the  lower  tail  uf the  income  distribution  and
savings  in the  upper  tail  means  that  sales  taxes  end  excises  are  regressive
in Pechman-Okner type inciderce calculations,  but progressive in the
Browning-Johnson  work.  This  change  is enough  to pzoduce  an overall  pattern
of average tax rates by income  range that is progressive,  rather than
proportional  as in  Pechman-Okner.
The key shifting  assumptions  used in some of these  cal"-lAtions
are displayed  in Table 1, along  with an indication  as to which produce
progressive  or regressive  incidence  results.  As can be seen, the major
areas of disagreement  centre  on the corporate,  property,  and sales and
excise taxes. 6 The income  tax is uniformly  treated as psid by income
recipients  and is progressive  due  to increasing  average  tax rates. Social
security  and related  contributions  are treated  as payroll  taxes  on labor
and,  outsiCe  of the  lower  tail  of the  income  distribution,  are  regressive-6  -
TABLE 1
INCIDENCE  ASSUMPTIONS  USED IN  DEVELOPED  COUNTRY  TAX INCIDENCE  CALCULATIONS  AND  THEIR EFFECTS  ON TAX INCIDENCE  PATTERNS
P/O most  P/O  least  B/JBJ
Incidence  Most  Most  redistributive  redistributive  Gillespie'C  competitive  alternative
pattern  progressive regressive  Shifting  assumptions  by Tax  cassa  bos.:  case'  bssic  :oset  cosec  casec
P  A)  Individual  incom  tax:  (not  shifted)
allocated  to taxpayers  according  to
income  taxes  paid.  X  X  X  X  X
8)  Corporation  income  tax:
P  - to capital  income  in general  X
P  X  - half  to capital  income  in  general;  half
to dividends  (stockholders)  X
A  X  - half  to capital  income  in  general;  half
to  total  consumption  x
P  - half  to capital  income  in  general;  half
to  factor  incomes  X  X
A  - half  to dividend  income;  half  to total
consumption
C)  Property  taxes:
i)  on  land
p  - to  capital  income  in  general  x  x
P  - to !andowners  X  x
P  X  - to capital  owners
P  X  - half  to capital  incom  in  general;
half  to  factor  incom  x
ii)  on structures  and improvements
P  X  -to  capital  income  in  general  X  x
R  X  -to  shelter  and  consumption  X  y
P  - half  to calital income  in  general;
half  to  factor  income  x
D)  Sales  and  excises
R  X  - to  consumers  of  taxed  goods  X  X  X
P  X  - to factor  incomes  X  X
E)  Social  security
i) on  employees
A  - to  employee  compensation  X  X  X  X  X
ii)  on  employers
A  - to  employee  compensation  X  X  X
A  X  - half  to  employee  compensation;
half  to  consumption  X
P  X  - half  to employee  compensation;
half  to factor  income  x
a  P/O refers  to  Pechman  and  Okn-r (1974).
b  Gill-spie  refers  to Gillospie  (1980)
c  B/J refers  to Browning  and  Johnson  (1979).
NOTE:  The first  column  of the  table indicates  whether a  particular shifting assumption results  in  a progressive  (P),  regressive  (R)  or
two  -.  __due to the cL-Plings  on contributions. Corporate  and property  taxes are
regressive  if treated  as shifted  'forward'  to consumers,  but  progressive  if
assumed  shifted  'backwards'  to recipients  of capital  income. 7 Corporate
taYes are even more progressive if assumed borne by capital income specific
to taxed industries rather than capital income in general, because of  light
tax treatment of widely  held housing capital.  In some literature, this
motivates  the  use  of  dividends  rather  than  all  capital  Income  (which
includes  dividends)  as  a  more  progressive  distributive  series  for
allocating corporate taxes.  Sales and excise taxes are regressive if borne
by consumers, and progressive if borne by recipients of factor incomes. 8
The  sensitivity of  incidence results  to the choice of  shifting
assumptions in developed country tax incidence calculations is a point that
is also developed in Whalley  (1984).  He reports a series of alternative
incidence  calculations  for  Canada,  all  based  on  the  same  1972
microconsistent demand, production and tax data set, originally constructed
for general equilibrium tax policy modelling (see St. Hilaire and Whalley,
1983).  Using  these  data  the main  features  of  the various  incidence
calculations  referred  to  above  are  reproduced,  and  even  more  extreme
shifting  assumptions.  reflecting  different  implicit  models,  used  to
dramatically  illustrate the  sensitivity of  tax  incidence conclusions  to
shifting  assumptions.
Whalley  reports  a number  of variations  on a set of central  case
assumptions  and calculations  which show  how the tax system  can be made to
appear  either  sharply  progressive  or sharply  regressive. The assumptions
used  in  this  central  case  variant  are  deliberately  kept  simple.  The
individual  income  tax  is  assumed  borne  by income  recipients,  with  no  uses
side  effects  from  the  tax. Capital  income  is  assumed  to bear  corporate  andproperty  taxes, irrespective of which  industries capital  is used  in; an
assumption of a long-run equilibrium situation with intersectorally mobile
capital.  Sales and excise  taxes are assumed borne on the uses side  in
proportion to taxed consumption.  Social security taxes are borne by labor
income,  with the ceiling on contributions  yielding a regressive pattern.
The incidence results implied by these assumptions are reported in
Table  2.  Using  central  case  incidence  assumptions,  total  tax  rates
increase from 27.5 percent to 43 percent moving from the poor to the rich,
showing a mild degree of progression intermediate to the Pechman-Okner and
Browning calculations discussed earlier.  Income tax rates reflect average
tax  rates  by  income  range  and  are  progressive.  The  incidence of  the
corporate  and  property  taxes  reflect  the  capital  income  distribution.
Increasing savings rates by income range produces a regressive pattern of
sales and excise tax rates.  Because of ceilings on annual contributions
for social security taxes, tax rates beyond the lower income ranges  are
regressive.
Whalley  then  shows  how  a  number  of  changes  in  incidence
assumptions can make the tax system appear substantially more progressive.
The central  case assumptions yield  three progressive  and two  regressive
taxes.  To  make  the  tax  system  more  progressive,  one  has  to  find
justifications  for  increasing the progressivity of  existing progressive
taxes and curtailing the regressivity of other taxes.  Whalley reports a
sequence of modifications to the central variant whose combined effect is
to produce sharp progressivity in the incidence calculation for the whole
tax system.  These change the range of average tax rates from 27.5 to 43
percent  (the central variant) to  11 to 70 percent (Panel B of Table 2),
implying such sharp progressivity that one might easily conclude that the
tax systam is significantly redistributive.-9-
Table  2
WHALLEY'S (1984)  TAX INCIDENCE  CALCULATIONS FOR CANADA
A.  Using Central Case Assumptions  and Income Concept !/  B. Most Pro-  C. Least Pro-
gressivo  gressivo
Incid-nce  Incidence
Treatment  b/  Treatment  c/
1972  Household  Personal  Corporate  Property  Sales  Social  Product-  Total  Tax  Total  Tax  Total  Tax
Income classes  Income  Income  Tax  and  Security  ion  Tax  Rate  (all  Rate  Rate
Tax  Tax  Excises  taxes)
Under 3  e,600  1.6  3.3  3.3  16.3  2.6  0.3  27.6  11.6  99.8  d/
6,500- 7,600  4.5  4.2  4.2  15.0  4.6  0.2  32.7  19.6  70.1
7,600- 8,600  7.0  3.6  3.6  14.8  6.1  0.2  36.4  23.0  82.2
8,600-10,000  9.5  2.8  2.8  14.2  5.8  0.2  36.0  26.6  61.2
10,000-11,500  10.8  3.2  3.2  13.9  4.7  0.3  36.1  27.5  44.1
11,600-13,000  12.3  2.7  2.7  12.8  4.5  0.3  35.3  30.3  42.2
13,000-14,500  13.5  2.6  2.6  12.5  4.2  0.2  35.6  32.0  38.9
14,500-16,000  14.7  2.5  2.5  11.9  3.9  0.2  35.7  35.0  38.0
16,000-18,500  16.2  3.6  3.7  11.6  3.6  0.2  37.8  38.3  35.1
18,600-21,000  14.9  3.4  3.5  11.9  3.2  0.2  37.1  37.4  34.6
21,000-26,000  16.9  3.4  3.5  10.4  2.9  0.2  37.4  44.4  31.1
25,000 and over  16.5  8.4  8.4  7.4  2.2  0.1  43.0  70.6  16.9
a/  Income is gross of income  tax,  gross  of  transfers,  with  a  further  adjustment  for the tax treatment of imputed
housing  income.
hi  Adds  future  capital  and  income  taxes  to  the  central  variant  with  Browning's  adjustment  for  current  period  sales  and
excise  taxes.  Furthermore,  inflation  taxes  on  savers  are  included;  allocation  of corporate taxes are  based on
dividends  rt'her  than  capital  incomes  and social security  taxes are treated as  benefit  taxes  and  excluded  from
incidence  calculations
c/  Human  capital  case:  unimproved  labor  incom is  assumed  equal for  each  wage  *asrnwr,  capital  income  does  not  bear  the
burden  of  capital  taxes,  and  the  portion  of  income  tax  allocated  to  capital.
_/  This  extreme  tax rate  is  a  special  feature  of  the  most  regressive  incidence  treatment  involving  assumptions  on  human
capital  and  capital  mobility,  and is  more  fully  discussed  in  Whalley  (1984).
Sourc-:  Whalley  (1984)- 10  -
This is done by treating savings as the purchase  of an annuity
yielding both a future consumption stream and future tax liabilities.  The
introduction of Browning's indexation adjustment for sales taxes introduces
further progression from the sources side.  Incorporating an inflation tax
on  savers  further  increases  tax  rate  progression  and  treating  social
security  contributions  as  a benefit  related charge, with  contributions
offsetting  benefits  received  over  the  lifetime  removes  an  element  of
regressivity from incidence calculations.  While deliberately constructed
so as to produce marked progression in the incidence calculation, Panel B
obviously  provides a different perception of the redistributive impact of
the tax system compared with either the Pechman-Okner or Browning-Johnson
calculations.
However, Whalley shows how it is also possible to change shifting
assumptions  further  to  make  the  tax  system  instead  appear  sharply
regressive.  A number of different arguments are discussed by Whalley, such
as international mobility arguments, under which capital doee not bear the
burden  of  any  taxes  including  personal  taxes  on  capital  income.  The
treatment  of  human  capital  is another  issue discussed by Whalley.  If
capital  cannot  bear  the  burden  of  taxes  due  to  international mobility
considerations,  and  human  and  non-human  capital  are  substitutes  in
production,  incidence  analysis  can  produce  tax  rate profiles  that  are
highly  regressive.  Panel  C  of  Table  2  reports results  from  the most
extreme of the regressive incidence variants reported by Whalley, with tax
rates falling from 99Z for the poorest group to 152 for the richest. 9
These calculations therefore emphasize the wide confidence ranges
that  need  to  be  used  in  interpreting  tax  incidence  calculations  in
developed countries.  The natural corollary is that many issues of implicit- 11  -
theorizing  need to be settled  before  further  incidence  calculations  can  be
meaningfully  interpreted. Thus, even before applying  developed  country
incidence  techniques  to developing  countries,  recent  literature  emphasizes
that  one  needs  to exercise  a fair  degree  of caution  because  of the  key role
played  by incidence  assumptions  in  determining  results.
An issue raised  by these concerns  over the choice of shifting
assumptions  is  whether  more progress  can  be made by replacing  the  implicit
models  which  underlie  most incidence  studies  by explicit  numerical  general
equilibrium  models in which production,  demand  and elasticity  parameters
are explicitly represented (this is the applied general equilibrium
approach set out in Shoven and Whalley (1984)).  Building  an explicit
general  equilibrium  model  allows  the  'arbitrariness'  of  shifting
assumptions  to be replaced  by an explicit  choice  of elasticities  and  model
form.  General equilibrium  models have the virtue that they explicitly
specify  both  the  model  and  the  parameter  values  and also  take  into  account
the deadweight  loss of the tax system  when calculating  incidence. Their
weakness  is that many alternative  forms of an equilibrium  model are
available, and available literature  does not provide a rich base of
parameter estimates on which to draw.  The arbitrariness  of shifting
assumptions  is thus,  to some  degree,  replaced  by the arbitrariness  of both
model  form  and  parameter  values.
Only one of the general  equilibrium  tax models  constructed  thus
far has been used to make an incidence calculation  for the whole tax
system. Using  their  model  of the  U.K.  economy  and the  tax-subsidy  system,
Piggott  and  Whalley  (1985,  Table  7.6)  report  a central  case calculation  in
which the gain to the top decile from replacing  the 1973 U.K. tax and
subsidy  system  by a yield-preserving  neutral  tax is in the range  of 20-25- 12 -
percent  of disposable  income,  with a similar lose to the bottom decile.
While there  are many features  of their  model that can be queried,  their
results  also suggest  qualifications  to the  proposition  that,  using annual
data.  the incidence  of taxes  is  prop  rtional. These  results  therefore  tend
to  support  the  proposition  that,  beyond  concerns  over  incidence
assumptions,  work on tax incidence  in developing  countries  should  also
explore  the  use  of numerical  general  equilibrium  techniques.
III.  Previous  Tax  Incidence  Studies  of Develoinz Countries
Concerns  over equity issues  with tax policies  have motivated  a
number  of studies  of tax incidence  on developing  countries  over the  years,
more typically  on a tax by tax  basis  rather  than  as studies  of the  whole
system. By and large,  these  studies  follow  the  same shifting  assumptions
approach  used in the conventional  Pechman-Okner  type of developed  country
incidence  analyses,  and  do so in a relatively  uncritical  way.  As a result
they tend to reach  similar  conclusions  regarding  the incidence  of several
of the  taxes  that  make  up the  wider  tax  system  to these  that  one  would  find
in the  more standard  developed  country  analyses. A small  number  of recent
studies  have examined  tax incidence  using general  equilibrium  techniques
(see  e.g., Habito, 1984,  Bovenburg,  1988,  and Chowdhury,  1990),  although
the important  non-tax  institutional  features  of developing  countries  which
we stress  later  in this  paper  do  not receive  significant  attention  in this
work.
On a tax by tax basis,  the  main incidence  themes  emerging  from
this  literature  are  as follows.- 13 -
Value  Added  Taxes (VAT)
In general,  all  studies  find  a  uniform  rate  VAT  to be a regressive
tax,  while also arguing  that this regressivity  could  be reduced  by having
differential  rates  for  different  commodities  and a supplementary  system  of
excises on "luxury goods".  These incidence  analyses of the VAT have
generally  been  based  on the  assumption  of full  forward  shifting.1 0 The  tax
is  usually  simply  allocated  among  income  brackets  using  data  on consumption
expenditures. Some recent  studies  have used an input-output  framework  to
take into  account  differential  rates  and  exempt  coimnodities  (see  Ahmad  and
Stern, 1988,  Ahmad and Ludlow, 1989,  and Bird and Miller, 1989a,  1989b)
while  continuing  to (implicitly)  assume  full  forward  shifting.
Other  Sales  Taxes
Conclusions  reached  on the incidence  effects  of manufacturer  and
wholesale  level sales taxes are similar  to those for the VAT i.e. such
taxes appear as regressive.  Full forward shifting  is again generally
assumed. Despite  the  widespread  use  of forward  shifting,  it is claimed  in
many developing  countries  that  producers  and  wholesalers  typically  apply  a
fixed percentage mark-up to prices, and that therefore full forward
shifting  does  not  occur. Econometric  studies  tend  to support  this  point  of
view, such as Jeetun's (1978b)  study of Pakistan  which finds only 35%
forward  shifting  from  increases  in  the  manufacturer's  level  sales  tax.
Excises
Incidence  analyses  of excise  taxes  are  once  again  typically  based
on  an assumption  of full  forward  shifting. A progressive  incidence  pattern
is  usually  obtained  for  excises  in aggregate.  A notable  exception  is trxes- 14 -
on tobacco  and cheap liquor,  which usually  have a regressive  incidence
pattern  as  in developed  countries,  because  of relatively  heavier
consumption  by the poor.  The tobacco  tax was found  to be regressive  in
Colombia  (McLure and Thirsk  1978, Cnossen, 1977) and  in Argentina,
Guatemala,  and Greece (see Cnossen 1977 and Bird and Miller 1989),  but
progressive  in Lebanon  (Cnossen  1977). Cnossen (1977)  finds  a regressive
incidence  and  Asher  and Booth (1983)  a progressive  impact  for this tax in
the  Philippines. Some excises  such  as  motor fuel  taxes  combine  aspects  of
taxing  luxury  consumption,  combining  ability  to pay  and  taxes  on the  use  of
public  services  (benefit  taxes  or user  charges). To the  extent  that these
taxes serve as user charges,  distributional  consequences  as captured  by
conventional  tax  incidence  analysis  may  be of  minor  consequence  for  policy.
Available  econometric  evidence  is once  again  at  variance  with the
full forward  shifting  assumption.  For example,  Naqvi (1975)  and Jeetun
(1978b)  estimated  the extent  of forward  shifting  in Pakistan  of excises  at
48%  and  31%  respectively.
Import  Duties
Import  duties  are  usually  assumed  to be fully  forward  shifted  to
consumers of imported goods, with  a regressive or proportional incidence
outcome the standard result (see Jeetun (1978a)).  Most developing country
incidence studies ignore the implications of quotas and  import licensing
for the shifting assumptions used.
General Indirect Taxes
When considered as a group, indirect (general sales, excise, and
trade/import) taxes are almost universally assumed to be shifted forward to- 15  -
consumers  of taxed coniodities. With a few exceptions  (see  Radhu 1965),
backward  shifting  and incomplete  forward  shifting  have not received  much
attention.  These taxes  are found to have a U-shaped  incidence  pattern,
with some  regresuivity  in the lower  income  ranges  for the  urban  and rural
poor (due to general sales taxes, taxes on tobacco  and cheap liquor),
progressivity  in the top income  brackets  (due to taxes on motor fuels,
liquor  and other  luxuries)  and a flat  incidence  profile  for the remaining
groups  (see  e.g. Foxley  et al, 1979 for  Chile  and Jeetun  1978,  and  Malik
and  Saqib  1989  for  Pakistan).
Export  Taxes
Primary  products  dominate  exports  from  many developing  countries.
For commodities  where no single  country cr a small group of countries
dominates  the  world  market,  little  forward  shifting  of the tax  to foreign
buyers  should  occur.  Most incidence  studies,  therefore,  assume  that the
incidence of export taxes f Ils on the producer-exporter  group, and,
correspondingly,  derive  a progressive  incidence  pattern  since  these  are in
the higher  income  ranges.  One recent  study for Sri Lanka (Jayasundera,
1986)  interestingly also considered implicit subsidies to domestic
consumers  associated  with export  taxes  on tea  and rubber,  and f-und  these
implicit  subsidies  were distributed  in a pro-poor  fashion.  The pro-poor
incidence  effects  of taxes can thus be reinforced  by pro-poor  incidence
effects  of implicit  subsidies.
Personal  Income  Taxes
Personal  income  taxes  are assumed  to fall  on individuals  who pay
these  taxes.  All developing  country  incidence  studies  thus show  personal- 16 -
income taxes to be progressive.  All these studies,  as far as we can
ascertain,  ignore  complications  stemming  from  tax  evasion  (which  we discuss
later).
CorDorate  Income  Taxes
The  shifting assumption commonly used in developing country
incidence  work for the corporate  tax is that 50% of the tax is shifted
forward  to consumers  and 50%  is borne  by owners  of capital  in  the  economy.
Under these assumptions,  the usual incidence finding is a  regressive
incidence  profile for the lowest  income  brackets,  a near flat incidence
profile  for the  middle  groups  and a progressive  incidence  profile  for  the
higher  income  groups.
Urban  Property  Taxes
The  overall  incidence of  the property tax  is found to be
progressive in most developing  country studies (see McLure 1971, 1972,
1977,  1979,  1987;  Linn 1980;  Bahl  and  Linn 1985;  Holland  and  Follain  1985).
For owner-occupied  residential,  commercial  and industrial  properties,  the
usual  shifting  assumption  is that the tax  falls  on capital  owners  with no
forwa-d shifting.  For  rental properties  varying degrees of forward
shifting are  assumed.  In general, property taxes on owner occupied
property  are found to have a progressive  incidence  pattern,  whereas the
rented properties component of the tax is regressive.  All available
studies ignore tax capitalization  effects,  whereby the imposition  of a
property  tax  leads  to a fall  in  the  market  value  of the  asset  (see  Chaudry-
Shah 1988, 1989).  With tax capitalization  effects  included,  a properly
administered  property  tax is likely  to  be somewhat  more  progressive  than  it
appears  under  traditional  assumptions.- 17 -
_.r$icultural  Land  Taxes
With agricultural  land taxes the usual incidence  assumption  is
that taxes  on large farms  fall on land owners,  and that for subsistence
agriculture  such  taxes  induce  increased  marketable  surpluses  resulting  in  a
decline  in agricultural  product  prices.  An implication  of this drawn in
some  studies  (Qureshi  (1987))  is that landowners  bear  more than  the  burden
of the  tax.  As land  ownership  is generally  concentrated  in a few  hands  in
most developing countries, a progressive  incidence of such a tax is
obtained  under  these  assumptions.
Sectoral  Incidence  of  Taxes
Although not emphasized  in developed  country stuties,  sectoral
incidence  of taxes  is also frequently  analyzed  in developing  country  work,
either for rural-urban  or agriculture-non-agriculture  groupings.  Such
studies  usually  make assumptions  as to the fraction  of tax  passed  between
different  sectors.
For  example,  a recent  study  for  Pakistan  (Qureshi  (1987))  assumes
that land  taxes  are borne  solely  by the  agricultural  sector;  personal  and
corporate income taxes by the non-agricultural  sector;  export taxes on
agricultural  commodities  by the agricultural  sector  and on manufactured
goods by the non-agricultural  sector.  Import  duties  are allocated  to
consumption  patterns  of dutiable imports; and other indirect  taxes by
relative  weights  in  consumption.  Under  these  assumptions,  the  agricultural
sector  emerges  as overtaxed  relative  to the  non-agricultural  sector.
The same conclusion  is also reached  by Kazi (1984)  for Pakistan
and  Lipton  (see  Toye 1978)  for  India  and  Jayasundera  (1986)  for  Sri  Lanka.
Opposite  conclusions  are reached  in several  studies  on India (see Mitra- 18  -
1963 and Gandhi 1966).  Jayasundera  (1986)  for Sri Larnka  examines  the
relative  tax burdens  by income  class in the  modern (non-agtlculture)  and
primary (agriculture)  sectors, and concludes that low to lower-middle
income individuals  are relatively  heavily taxed in the primary sector
compared  to the  modern  sector.
The  Overall  Tax  system
Developing country tax  incidence studies generally find the
overall  tax svstem  to be broadly  progressive  (pro-poor),  showing  either  a
U-shaped  (see  e.-.  Malik  and  Saqib,  (1989)  for  Pakistan,  McLure  (1971)  for
Columbia)  or a  progressive  (see e.g. Jayasundera,  (1986)  for Sri Lanka,
Lovejoy, (1958) for Jamaica and Sahota, (1969) for Brazil) incidence
pattern.  Exceptions  to this include  Wasylenko (1985)  for Jamaica,  who
finds an inverted  U-shaped  incidence  pattern  for the overall  tax system,
implying  that  the  tax  system  redistributes  from  the  middle  income  groups  to
the  poor and  the  rich.
IV. Non-Tax  Policy  Elements  in  DeveloDing  Countries  and  Tax  Incidence
Analysis
Thus, shifting assumptions  similar to those used in developed
country incidence work are widely employed in tax incidence  work on
developing  countries.  Remarkably,  almost  none of the available  studies
takes into account central developing  country features such as price
controls,  protection,  rationed  foreign  exchange,  credit raticning,  urban
rural  migration  processes  and  other  features. This  is the  case  even though
these may potentially radically change incidence analyses and implied
policy  conclusions  for  the  countries  studied.- 19  -
One  of the central  points  of this paper  is that the mechanical
application  of developed  country tax incidence  approaches  to developing
countries  can have pitfalls.  A wider network  of policies  surrounds  tax
systems  in these  countries,  and  these  have,  in some  way, .o be taken  into
account in making incidence  determinations. What might seem reasonable
assumptions  for developed  countries  can be very unreasonable  assumptions
for developing  countries. The issue,  then, is what kinds  of assumptions
and  analyses  should  one  use  and  for  which  kind  of  country.
Because  the  characteristics  of individual  developing  countries  are
so varied,  there  can  be no single  tax  incidence  approach  applicable  to all
of them.  However,  broad  groupings  of countries  are still  instructive  for
discussing  developing  country  tax systems  and their implications  for tax
incidence analysis.  Table 3 presents a classification of types of
developing  cointries  and summarizes  some of the key differences  between
them  that  need  to be considered  in  tax  incidence  work.
A.  Agrarian  Economies  with a limited  tax  base:  Import  duties  and
excises  are  primary  source  of revenue
These are primarily agrarian economies  with heavy reliance  on
trade  taxes  and  excises,  including  export  taxes  (on  average  602 of central
government  revenues, see Appendix Table A.1).  There are considerable
differences  in the share  of trade  taxes  among individual  countries  and in
an extreme  case (Gambia),  trade  taxes  constitute  78%  of central  government
revenues  (see Appendix  Table A.1).  Since these countries  have a small
export  base, tax revenues  primarily  accrue  from import  duties.  Thus, in
analyzing  tax incidence,  one needs to focus largely  on tariffs,  and the
import  licensing  and  exchange  control  regimes.- 20  -
Table 3
DEVELOPING COUNTRY FEATURES IWPORTANT  IN TAX INCIDENCE  ANALYSIS
Country Type
A  B  _  _  _  _  _
Low Income  Lower  H;gh-rm iddle  Newly
Significant Features for  Agrarian  Middle  Income  Semi-  Industralized
Tax Incidence Analyses  Income  industrialized  Countries
1.  International Trade Taxes
large, if not dominant  X  X  X
2.  Limited  Coverage of Income Tax  X  X
3.  Social  Security/
Payroll Taxes  Important  X
4.  Sales Taxes Important  X  X  X
S.  Public Enterprises imply
significant  government ownership
of the Corporate sector  X  X  X
8.  Foreign ownership important  X  X
7.  Reasonably broad tax system,
good compliance  x
8.  Widespread  tax  evasion  X  X
9.  Quantity  and  price  Inter-
ventions.  X  X  X
10.  Black markets widespread  X  X  X- 21 -
In addition,  in  many of these  countries  a small  number  of traders
exercise  significant  control  over  the  entire  imL1port  trade  and  earn  monopoly
profits.  Import duties are likely to be borne out of these profits,
because of quantity constraints  on imports through import licensing.
However,  black market activity  and smuggling  may further  complicate  the
analysis. Income  taxes in such countries  are primarily  paid by salaried
employees,  but  are  small  and  play  only  a  small,  or  even,  insignificant  part
in the  tax  system.
A large number  of African countries  and a few Asian countries,
e.g. Bangladesh,  Sri Lanka,  Myanmar (Burma)  and Nepal fit this category.
In these countries,  the informal  sector  almost  completely  escapes  taxes.
Substantial  economic  activity  is carried  out  by owner-operated  enterprises,
cottage  industries,  and small  size farm owners  outside  of the formal  tax
system.
B.  Lower  Middle  Income  Countries:  still  with narrow  tax  bases,  but  a
more  expansive  tax  system:
These countries have a small manufacturing  base, and specific
excises  are  relatively  more important  sources  of revenue  than  trade  taxes.
These countries have manufacturing level sales taxes, and income and
payroll  taxes,  although  with  only  limited  coverage.  Smaller
agrarian/commodity  exporting  countries  in Central  America,  Caribbean  and
Latin America  (excluding Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela) fit this
characterization  (see Appendix  Table A.2).  Tax incidence  analyses  for
these  countries  also  depend  critically  upon  the  industry  and  product  market
structure  for  excisable  commodities.- 22 -
C.  Hither  Income.  Semi-Industralized  Countries  with a  more  widespread
tax  saltem,  but large  scale  tax  evasio..:
These countries have a significant  manufacturing  tax base and
fairly sophisticated  overall tax structure.  Tax evasion is, however,
widespread,  and the informal  sector  and the black  economy  are pervasive.
In addition,  public  enterprises  provide  a significant  source  of government
revenues (and/or expenditures  through subsidies).  Larger lower  middle
income  countries  in Asia (e.g.  India,  Pakistan,  Indonesia,  ASEAN  excluding
Singapore)  and  South  America  (e.g.  Brazil,  Argentina  and  Mexico)  to  varying
degrees  fit  this  categorization  (see  Appendix  Table  A.3).
D.  Newly  Industrslized  Countries  with  mature  and  advanced  tax
systems:
These  countries  have  a sophisticated  structure  of income  and sales
taxes,  which are much more effectively  administered.  Tax evasion and
compliance  is not as serious  a problem  as in the  countries  in category  C.
As  a  result,  developed  country  incidence  approaches  require  less
modification  for  use in these  countries  than  for  the  other  country  groups.
Higher  income,  high growth,  and export  oriented  countries  such as Korea,
Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong all have tax systems that fit this
characterization  (see  Appendix  Table  A.4).
V.  Pitfalls  in  ARRlving  Developed  Country  Incidence  Analyses  to
Developing  Countries
The large  differences  across  developing  countries  stressed  above
suggest that what constitutes  appropriate  tax incidence analysis  will- 23 -
differ  from  one  country  to  the  next.  In  particular,  where  they  are
important,  non-tax  institutional  features,  such  as  informal  or  black
markets, urban-rural migration, credit rationing, industry concentration,
product market  competition, price controls, import licensing regulations,
exchange controls, quantitative restrictions, and other features, they may
need to be recognized and explicitly dealt with.  Existing tax incidence
work  for  developing  countries,  for  the  most  part,  ignores  these
considerations  when making and reporting incidence calculations.
Thus while  there  is a  significant  body  of  literature  on  tax
incidence in developed countries, which  more  recently has  itself raised
many  unsettled  issues,  there  are  further  questions  as  to  whether
conventional  developed  country  incidence  approaches  can  be  applied  to
developing countries  without more recognition of special developing country
features.
Take,  for  example,  the  issue  of  the  appropriate  shifting
assumption  to use  in analysis of  the  incidence of trade  taxes,  and  in
particular tariffs.  In many  developing countries the appropriateness or
otherwise of an assumption of full forward shifting depends upon whether or
not quotas are present, and, in turn, whether they are binding.  Because
they are a significant revenue source in lower income developing countries,
whet..er  they are treated as lumpsum taxes borne by recipients of rents from
quotas,  or  passed  forward  to  consumers  in  higher  prices  dramatically
affects the conclusion of any incidence analysis of such taxes.11  Indeed,
rationed foreign exchange, prior import deposit schemes, and other forms of
quantity constraints on  imports operate in many  countries, and these can
similarly affect the conclusion from incidence analyses.  An assumption of
forward  shifting  implies  that tariffs  (or other  trade distortions)  are- 24 -
treated in a similar manner to sales taxes in developed country analyses,
and, hence, tend to be viewed as regressive.  An assumption that tariffs
are  borne  by  recipients  of  quota  rents  because  of  import  quantity
constraints tends to make  such taxes appear progressive, since rights to
quota are usually allocated to higher income groups.
A  further example arises with  the sales tax which can also have
different incidence effects from those in developed country analyses if a
significant number of taxed commodities are affected by price controls as
is comon  in many developing countries.  If a seller of taxed products is
legally permitted to pass such taxes forward, then the tax is fully shifted
to consumers of taxed products, independently of any elasticity assumptions
on the demand or supply  side.  If, on the other hand, the seller is not
allowed to pass taxes forward, the tax is fully borne by the seller of the
product.  If,  in  addition,  there  are  black  markets,  either  a  forward
shifted  or  backward  shifted  sales tax will  have  effects on  both black
market prices and the quantity of activity on these markets.  The effect of
a forward shifted tax  (by raising white market prices) may  be to divert
more expenditures onto the black market, drive up black market prices, and
shorten  the  length  of  queues  on white  markets.  Since  the  rich  are
frequently alleged to transact more heavily on black markets, these second
round effects will shift proportionately more of the burden of such taxes
onto  the  rich.12 These  effects  are  also  typically  not  considered  in
existing developing country incidence analyses.
Incidence analysis of the corporate tax can also be affected by
special  developing  country  considerations.  If  there  is a  foreign  tax
credit and the corporate tax applies to a  foreign-owned (either fully or
majority foreign-owned) corporation operatin3 in a developing country, then- 25  -
the tax will largely be ?aid by the foreign treasury and, as such, has no
direct  domestic  incidence  effects.  In  addition,  in  some  developing
countries  manufacturing and distribution corporations are wholly or heavily
government owned, complicating the usual backward shifting assumption that
capital  fully  bears  the  burden  of  the tax.  Also,  if  there  is credit
rationing,  as  is common  in many  developing countries,  this can  further
affect the perceived incidence of the tax.  This is because with  credit
rationing, the corporate tax will primarily take rents away from those who
qualify for rationed credit.
Thus,  the  interaction of  taxes with  other policy  interventions
seems, a priori, so important for most developing countries that one simply
has to take them into account  when analyzing their incidence effects.  This
is because the tax system co-exists with a much wider network of policies
in developing countries, and these can substantially change the perceived
incidence of taxes relative to developed countries.  Many of these policy
elements do not operate  in developed countries, and  so are neglected  in
developed country analyses.  Because the tax system absorbs such a large
share  of national  income  in developed  countries, the  direct effects  of
taxes often dominate whatever additional effects may come into play from
other policy  interventions of governments.  In developing countries, the
opposite is usually true.  Taxes account for a smaller share of national
income, other  factors are more  important and become correspondingly more
relevant for incidence analysis.
How these interactions  with other policies can potentially affect
developing country tax incidence analyses is illustrated in Table 4.  In
the table, developed country shifting assumptions conventionally used are
listed for each tax, with an indication as to how a range of special- 26  6
Tablo  4
SOME  DEVELOPING  COUNTRY  CHARACTERISTICS
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS  FOR  SHIFTING  ASSUMPTIONS  AND  TAX INCIDENCE  ANALYSES
Conventional  Developed  Differences  From  Differences  From Effects  on  Differences  From Effects  on  Differences  From  External
Country  Incidence  Effects  on  Rents  Black  Markots  and Tax  Evasion  Rural-Urban  Migration  Sector  Complications
Assumptions
Income  Paid  by recipients.  None  Increaxed  evasion  from  rate  in-  If  expected  wage  equalized  None
Tax  creases,  effective  progressivity  across  modern  and  traditional
of tax is redue  d or offset,  sectors  and if  tax  only paid
in  modern  sector,  some  of the
burden  is shifted  to the
traditional  sector  through
intersectoral  wage  effects.
Corporate  Shifted  backwards  to  With  credit  rationing,  Production  diverted  to black  morket,  None  If  large  degree  of  foreign
Tax  owners  of capital,  or  tax  will be wholly  or  raising  white  market  queuing  costs  ownorship,  and taxes  are
shifted  forwards  to  fully  borne  by  and hence  black  market  prices. Tax  creditable  abroad,  corporste
consumers  of taxed  recipients  of rationed  can be borne  by consumer  and  tax ay be fully  borne  by
items.  credit.  and  producers  supplying  to both  Treasury  of source  (dave-
markets. Outcome  depends  on model  loped)  country
form  and elasticitios.
Soles  Tax  Paid  by purchasers  of  If price  controls  apply, Taxes  divert  more  production  onto  If  tax is  paid  only  on sales  Tax  component  on imports
toxed  commoditi-es  and legal  pass-forward  black  markets,  raising  white  market of manufactures,  and if  these  reduces  rents  accruing  to
of tax disallowed,  tax  quouing  costs  and  hence  black  orre  ore heavily  consumed  by  recipients  of import  or
is  fully  borne  by  fixed  market  prices. Tax  can be borne  urban  residents,  tax will  foreign  exchange  licenses.
factors  in taxed  sectors,  both  by consumers  and  producers  offect  rural-urban  migration
supplying  to both  markets. Outcome and intersectoral  wage  differ-
depends  on elasticity  valuos  and  entials. Tax will  portly  be
other  paroaters.  borne  by residents  in  urban
sector.
Trade  Paid  by purchasers  of  With  binding  import  With smuggling,  higher  tariffs  Protection  (through  tariffs  Discussed  in  asax  row  of
Taxxs  taxed  products  for  quotas  or rationed  increase  smuggling  with  higher  and  quotas)  tendo  to increase table.
imports  (via  tariffs), foreign  exchange,  rationing  premix  for  foreign  urban  production,  urban  wage"
Borne  by sellers  of  tariffs  redueo  rents  exchange,  and  higher  prices  for  and  affects  rural-urban  wage
tax oxported  products  received  by quota  consumers  on both  black  and  white  differentials  through  induced
(vin  export  tax).  recipients  rather  than  markets.  migration.
affect  prie-s  paid  by
consumers.
Payroll  Employer  contribution  None  Limited  evasion  of payroll  taxes.  If tax paid  on payroll  in  None.
Tax  borne  by employer;  urban  sector,  indueod  effects
employee  contribution  on rural-urbon  migration,
by employ-e,  or  and rural  labor  be-re  some
both  contributione 
of tax  burden.
borne  by employee.- 31 -
law is  written.  The incidence  outcome  does  not  depend  on demand  and supply
elasticities in markets for taxed products, as in a typical developed
country  situation.
In most developing  countries,  however,  price controls  also spawn
black or parallel markets, in part to avoid price controls, but also
because of tax evasion.  An important  effect of a sales or excise tax,
therefore,  may be to change the relative  size of black and white market
activity  and this can also have important  implications  for any incidence
analysis  of their  effects.
An indication  of how  these  black  market  interactions  can  come into
play  can be seen  from two  recent  papers  by Mohammed  and  Whalley (1985)  and
Nguyen and Whalley  (1989).  These  papers highlight  the  equilibrium
conditions  linking  black and white  markets,  and show how price changes  in
white  markets,  due  to,  say,  a tax,  reverberate  onto  black  markets.
Thus,  if there  are  penalties  for  those  caught  transacting  on black
markets  and endogenously  determined  search  costs  involved  in  transacting  on
white markets at the controlled  prices (the  larger  the excess  demand,  the
larger  the  search costs),  buyers and sellers (assuming risk neutral
behavior) on both black and white markets must face the same effective
prices  in equilibrium  (gross  of search  costs,  or  net of  expected  penalties)
on the  two  markets.1 7
For simplicity,  we assume  black  market  penalties  are only imposed
on sellers. Thus,  for  buyers
(2)  pB  *  +  S
where  pB is  the  black  market  price,  P is  the  controlled  price  on official- 32 -
(white)  markets, and S are endogenously  determined  search costs faced by
buyers  on  white (or  official)  markets.
And for  sellers
(3)  pB - I.K  - P
where - is the endogenously  determined  probability  per unit sale  of being
detected  selling  on black markets,  and K is the penalty or fine rate per
unit sold.  Mohammed  and  Whalley,  and Nguyen  and  Whalley both assume  7  is
an increasing  function  of the ratio of black market to official  market
sales.  In this framework,  changes  in price controls  change  black market
prices, the length  of queues  on white markets,  and the risk of detection
for  black  market  traders. Lowering  price  controls  increase  the  ratio
between  pB and P  and  increases  queuing  costs  on  white  markets.  Stronger
enforcement  designed  to curtail  black  markets (higher  -)  increases  search
costs  on  white  markets,  and  can  therefore  decrease  overall  social  welfare.
A  sales or excise tax in this framework  which is allowed to be
passed forward will  divert more  activity to black markets,  increase
effective  consumer  prices (gross  of queuing  costs)  and increase  penalties
paid by black market traders.  The tax will thus be borne both on the
production  and consumer side of the economy  and in ways quite different
from  conventional  analysis. The incidence  of the  tax  will also  depend  upon
whether buyers  or sellers  are liable  for the tax,  a result  different  from
conventional  developed  country  analysis  in  which legal  liability  for taxes
is  seen  as of  no economic  consequence.
Thus, if sellers on official  markets are liable for the tax at
rate  t, the  equilibrium  conditions  above  change,  so  that  for sellers  across
black  and  white  markets;- 33 -
(4)  pB - 'y  Kom Pi(-t)
while condition  (2)  for buyers is unchanged. The effect  of the tax is to
divert  sales to black  markets lowering  black  market  prices and increasing
probabilities of detection.  The  lower black market prices, from (2),
reduce  queuing  and search  costs  on  white  markets.  Consumers  (buyers)  thus
benefit  from  the tax through  lowered  black  market  prices  and reduced  white
market search  costs.  This implies  that  producers  (sellers)  must more than
bear the burden of the tax, reflecting  the reduction  in effective  seller
prices  on black  markets  as  well as  white  markets.
On the other  hand, if buyers  on white  markets are liable for the
tax,  the  equilibrium  condition  (2)  is  changed  to (5).
(5)  pB - P(l+t)+S
while condition (3) remains  unchanged.  In this case pB will rise,  which
from  (3) must  produce an offsetting change in  -y (the probability of
detection).  Sellers  are no  better  off under the tax, while buyers
(consumers)  more than fully  bear the burden of the tax through  increased
black  as  well as  white  market  prices.
Thus,  for  sales  and  excise  taxes  appropriate  incidence  assumptions
depend  upon  whether  and  how  changes  in  black  market  activity  are taken  into
account  as taxes change.  If taxes  increase  the amount  of activity  taking
place on black  markets,  their  effect  will be to increase  queuing  costs on
white markets and through the equilibrium  conditions linking  black and
white  markets  also raise  black  market  prices.  The incidence  of taxes  will,
therefore,  fall on consumers  purchasin.g  on both black and white markets
through  higher  prices,  as  well as on  producers.
Because data is not readily available  which allow a link to be
made  between  black  market  activity  and  the  personal  distribution  of income,- 34 -
taking these effects into account in incidence  calculations  is not easy.
Anecdotal  evidence,  however,  indicates  that the coverage  of price  controls
and the siza of black marke. activity in many countries  is surprisingly
large.18
VIII.  Tax  Evasion  and the  Incidence  of Income  Taxes
A  further  common feature facing  tax policy  makers in developing
countries  and neglected  in  incidence studies  is tax evasion.1 9 In
developed  country  analysis,  the  conventional  assumption  when looking  at the
income  tax is to assume that the tax is fully borne by the payer of the
tax.  In the presence of the form of evasion found in many developing
countries,  however,  things  change.
Thus in a  simple model in which evasion involves bribery of
officials,  the  br.be  B is  related  to  taxes  owing,  T, through  the  bribe rate
r.  In practice,  as Gang et al. (1989)  suggest,  the bribe rate,  will be
endogenously  determined,  although  for simplicity  here we assume it to be
fixed.
(6)  B  - r.T.
In this  world, the effect  of increasing  tax rates  will be to increase  T,
but also to increase  B.  If the bribe rate is high and tax compliance  is
low, the redistributive impacts of the bribe system  will dominate the
direct redistributive  effects  of the income  tax.  The relevant  issue then
is  who receives  the  bribes.
One  scenario is  that, through  a  seniority system in public
service, high officials with higher income and wealth receive a large
portion  (or the  majority)  of  the bribes,  along with  proressionals- 35  -
(accountants)  who often  act as "middlemen"  in this  process. Increasing  the
income tax can thus trigger a reverse  distributional  process from  middle
class businessmen and others to wealthy elites, an entirely opposite
conclusion  to that one would obtain from applying  conventional  developed
country  incidence  analysis  to  the income  tax  in  developing  countries.
The  extent  of  evasion  and  its links  to  rent  transfers  in
particular  countries  is d'fficult  to determine. As yet,  to our knowledge,
no  tax  incidence  work  taking  these  effects  into  account  has  leen
undertaken.  Anecdotal  evidence  referred  to above (see footnote  18) once
again  suggests  that  this  is an  extensive  problem  in a  number  of countries.
IX.  Rural-Urban  Migration  Effects  and  the  Incidence  of Income  and
Payroll  Taxes
Yet another  example  of how important  differences  can arise  between
results  from  developed  country  incidence  assumptions  and  those  suggested  by
models ircorporating key developing country characteristics  arises with
income  and  payroll  taxes. A prominent  feature  of  many  developing  countries
over  recen.  decades  has been  both  a rapid  increase  in rural-urban  migration
during the developmental phase, and major concern over the rural-urban
migration  effects  of policy  changes.  In a Harris-Todaro  (1970)  model, fcr
instance,  an rural-urban  wage differential.  via urban  unemployment,  yields
an  equilibrium  condition  with  equ-.l  expected wages  across  the  two
sectors.20
Thus
(7)  WR - piu- 36  -
where  WR ia the  rural  wage rate,  p is  the  probability  of  being  employed  in
the  urban  sector,  and  Qu is the  downward  rigid  urban  wage.
In many developing  countries,  de facto,  income  and payroll trxes
apply only to the modern sector  which, in turn, can be equated  with the
urban sector.  If the income  tax operates as a tax on the urban sector
only,  increases  in income  taxes  will affect  urban-rural  migration  patterns.
Taxes, in turn, affect the number of workers who remain in the rural
sector,  and affects  rural wages.  The traditional developed country
incidence  treatment  of the  income  tax,  namely  that  taxpayers  fully  bear the
burden  of the tax  out of the income  they  receive,  is inappropriate  in such
a  framework. 21  Part of the burden  is shifted  to rural  workers  who legally
pay none of the tax.  Similar issues arise with incidence analysis of
payroll  taxes. 22
The potential importance  of this effect can also be illustrated
using data for  Pakistan  for 1984-85. In Pakistan  only the  urban sector  is
subject to personal income tax.  A eraduated  gross revenue surcharge is
ivsosed  on the rural sector  which acts as a pseudo income  tax, but with
minor revenue  consequences. The traditional  approach  to the incidence  of
income taxes,  which assumes that the burden of the tax falls fully on
individuals  with liability  to pay such taxes is reflected  in Panel A of
Table 6.  From  this personal income taxes appear to be a progressive
element  in the  overall  tax structure  in  Pakistan.
The Harris-Todaro  effect  in incidence  calculations  is captured  in
two alternative  calculations.  Panel B of Table 6 reports calculations
based  on the assumption  that  a significant  proportion  of the income  tax is
shifted  from  the  urban  to the  rural  sector  in  the form  of reduced  wages for
rural  households  earning  less  than  Rs. 24,000  per annum  (most  potential- 37  -
Tablo  6
SENSITIVITY  OF  PERSONAL  INCOME  TAX  INCIDENCE  CALCULATIONS  IN  PAKISTAN
TO  ALTERNATIVE  APPROACHES
(Tax  as  a  percent  of  total  inco-e)
1984-85  Household  A.  TRADITIONAL  VIEW  B.  THE  NEW  VIEW  I  C.  THE  NEW  VIEW  II Income  Class*s  (R's)  Urban  Rural  Pakistan  Urban  Rural  Pakistan Urban  Rural  Pakistan
Under  7200  0  0  0  0  0.74  0.58  0  0.64  0.42 7200  8400  0  0  0  0  0.83  0.63  0  0.60  0.46 8400  9600  0  0  0  0  0.  8  0.63  0  0.64  0.46 9600 12000  0  0  0  0  0.73  0.46  0  0.52  0.34 12000 18000  0.02  0  0.01  0.01  0.67  0.36  0.01  0.41  0.25 18000 24000  0.04  0  0.02  0.02  0.70  0.38  0.02  0.32  0.18 24000 30000  0.02  0.00019 0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.29  0.13 30000  38000  0.20  0.00038 0.13  0.09  0.02  0.06  0.09  0.26  0.16 36000  42000  0.22  0.00036 0.16  0.10  0.02  0.07  0.10  0.31  0.17 42000 48000  0.40  0.00074 0.29  0.18  0.03  0.13  0.18  0.19  0.18 48000 54000  0.77  0.00017 0.50  0.36  0.01  0.23  0.36  0.18  0.29 64000 plus  1.33  0.00270 1.04  0.61  0.11  0.47  0.61  0.13  0.48
Overall  incidence
pattern  P  P  P  P  R  A  P  R  A
Notes:  P:  Progressivo;  R:  Regressive  and  A:  Ambiguous
Case  Descriptions:
Traditional  View: The  burden  of  tax  falls on whom it is lovied.  Calculations  are  based  on  actual  tax collectiona  by  incom,  class  as reported  in tho Household  Income  and Expenditure  Survey  1984-86.  All figures  from  this  survey  are  adjusted  to  bring  the total  in  line  with  the  Public  Finance  Statistice  data. Note  that  the  income  tax  collections  reported  for the rural  sector  are  oither  due  to  tax  originating  from urban  source  income  of  rural  households  and/or  from tho graduated  land  revonue  surcharge  imposed  on  the rural  sector.
The  Now  View  I: A  tax  on  urban incom through  its  impact  on  urban-rural  *i stion  depreses  swages in  tho rural  sector.  In  this  case  this  impact  falls  on the wag' income  in  th, ural  sector  in  %.he  range  of incomes  upto  Rs.24,000  per  annum.  Th- shortfala  in reported  tax collec..ons  by  incom  class  in  the Pakistan  Household  Income  and Expenditure  Survey  1984-86  and total income  tax  collections  for  1984-85 stated  in  Public  Finance  Statistics  1987-88  is  attributed  to  wage  incomes  in  the  rural  sector  in  the  income range  of  upto  Rs.24,000  and  under.
The  Now  View  II:  Same  as  the  Now  View  I  except  that  the  tax  shortfall  is  borne  by  wag9 in  general  in  the rural  sector.- 38 -
migrants ccme from these income classes).  The discrepancy  between the
taxation  statistics  and income  tax  payments  data,  as reported  in the  HHIES
1984-85,  serves as a proxy for the total income  tax burden borne by the
rural sector.  Under these assumptions,  a regressive  incidence  pattern  of
the tax for the  rural sector  and an ambiguous  pattern  of tax incidence  for
Pakistan  as a whole is obtained.  The progressivity  of the tax for the
urban  sector  is  maintained.
A variation  on this theme is  where part of the tax falls  on all
rural  wages, as reported  in Panel C of Table 6.  This  variant echoes the
same  theme  as in results  reported  in  Panel  B.
X.  Credit  Rationing.  Foreign  and  State  Ownership  and  the Incidence  of
the  Cory  rate  Tax
The presence  of credit  zationing  and foreign  and state  ownership
provide  yet  further  examples of how  developed country tax incidence
assumptions  can be  misleading  in  developing  country  tax incidence  analysis,
in this case of the corporate  tax.  Credit rationing,  for instance,  is  a
common  element  in  the  policy  regime  in  many developing  countries. If firms
are subject  to credit  rationing,  the corporate  tax  will operate  as akin to
a tax on pure rent,  much as trade taxes fall on holders of licences  if
there are  binding  quotas.  This differs  from  the trade  tax case since the
tax  will be borne from  rents  accruing  to stockholders  of firms  as a result
of their access  to rationed  credit.  Traditional  cost of capital  analysis
as widely used in a developed country setting, as well as traditional
incidence  assumptions,  will also  not  apply  in the  same  way. 23
The degree and extent of credit rationing is documented in the
World Bank (1989).24 This source  suggests  that 702 of the new lending  by- 39 -
commercial banks in 1986 in Pakistan was directed by the Government.  In
India in 1986, 502 of the bank assets  were required to be pliced in reserve
requirements or government bonds and 40% of the remainder to be lent to
priority sectors at government dictated interest rates.  In Brazil in 1987
and in Turkey in the early  1980's more than two-third of the credit was
advanced  either  at  government  directive  or at preferential  rates.  In
Malaysia  on  the  average  30%  of  the  bank  credit  is  directed  by  the
Government.  A  large rumber  of  developing  countries have  also  adopted
complicated credit regimes and credit guarantees.
A  further complication affecting tax incidence analysis in many
countries  is  that a  significant portion of  the manufacturing  sector  is
either foreign-owned or has substantial foreign involvement (see Table 7).
%  a  foreign  tax  credit  applies  under  the domestic  law of  the source
country  (such as  in the U.S.), when  investing in a developing country a
portion of the corporate tax may be borne by the treasury of the foreign
country  from where  the  investment  originated.  In  such circumstances,
agonizing over the traditional polar assumptions of full shifting of the
corporate  tax  back  onto  capital  or  forward  to  consumers  :aay be
inappropriate.
Finally,  state  ownership  of  the  corporate  sector  introduces
further complications for incidence analysis of the corporate tax.  Table 8
indicates the state ownership and control of  industrial undertakings in a
number of developing countries.  That part of corporate tax revenues raised
from state owned enterprises represents an internal transfer of funds for
the Government, with no direct incidence  effects.
Table  9  presents  incidence  aralyses  of  the  corporate  tax  in
Pakistan, for 1984-85 under alternative assumptions.  The first three- 40 -
Table 7
IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF CAPITAL IN
VARIOUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Capital of Foreign Affiliates
(2  GNP)
Year  x
Mexico  1982  7.0
Argentina  1983  23.9
Brazil  1982  11.1
Colombia  1984  15.8
Venezuela  1982  10.0
Hong Kong  1981  15.2
Indonesia  1982  10.9
South Korea  1983  1.9
Malaysia  1984  26.6
Singapore  1983  65.3
Taiwan  1981  2.0
South Africa  1982  22.8
Turkey  1983  0.5
Pakistan  1982  11.2 a/
Notes:
a/  Of total corporate capital stock.
n.a. Data not available.
Source:  Mexico and Pakistan: World Bank staff estimates.
All other countries: John Dunning and John Cantwell, editors. (1987).- 41 -
Table 8
NON-FINANCIAL STATE  OWNED  ENTERPRISE  SHARES OF  INVESTMENT FOR
SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Country  Year  Percentage  share  of
manufacturing investment
Zambia  1984  77.5
Burma  1984  69.8
Venezuela  1984  52.2
Guyana  1984  41.9
Tunisia  1984  38.7
Algeria  1985  37.7
Morocco  1985  33.1
Turkey  1985  30.5
Congo  1983  39.8
Tanzania  1984  28.0
Chile  1985  27.5
Bangladesh  1985  22.1
Mex4co  1984  21.8
Portugal  1984  20.4
Brazil  1985  17.5
Pakistan  1987  17.3
Philippines  1984  15.3
Nepal  1984  14.1
Costa Rica  1985  13.2
Source:  Pakistan:  Government  of  Pakistan,  Finance  Division,  Economic
Survey 1987-88, p.111.
Other countries:  Nair, G. and A. Filippides (1988).- 42 -
Table 9
CORPORATE TAX INCIDENCE IN PAKISTAN UNDER ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
(Tax as a percent of total income)
1984-85  Household
income classes  Traditional Analysis  The New View
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D)
Under  7200  1.18  1.71  1.56  0.85
7200 - 8400  1.06  1.55  1.64  0.77
8400 - 9600  1.04  1.53  1.70  0.76
9600 - 12000  1.26  1.62  1.69  0.91
12000 - 18000  1.46  1.70  1.69  1.06
18000 - 23000  1.70  1.79  1.68  1.24
24000 - 30000  1.68  1.76  1.69  1.22
30000 - 36000  1.75  1.78  1.68  1.28
36000 - 42000  1.77  1.78  1.66  1.29
42000 - 48000  1.81  1.79  1.65  1.32
48000 - 54000  1.89  1.76  1.63  1.34
54000 plus  2.01  1.74  1.64  1.46
Overall Incidence  Pro-  Pro-  Pro-  Pro-
Pattern  gressive  portional  portional  gressive
Case Descriptions:
Traditional Analysis
Case A:  The burder.  of corporate tax falls on capital income in general.
Case B:  Corporate tax burden is allocated one-half to capital income and cne-
half to consumption expenditures.
Case C:  Corporate tax is allocated one-half to capital income and one-half to
labor income.
The New View
Case D:  The taxes paid by state-owned enterprises (22% of total corporate tax
collections) have no distributional implications; similarly the taxes
paid  by  foreign companies  (52 of total)  are assumed  to be  paid  by
foreign  treasuries  and  have  no  incidence  implications  and;  th.e
remaining  taxes  (73% of  total)  are  allocated to  capital  income in
general.- 43 -
panels  report  incidence  calculations  using  variants  of  traditional
developed country approaches.  These calculations ignore such features of
Pakistan's economy  as credit  rationing, and ownership of the  industrial
sector by both the Government and by foreign enterprises.
Under traditional assumptions, the corporate tax has a progressive
incidence pattern if it is allocated to capital income but a proportional
incidence  pattern  if  a  significant portion of  the  tax is  allocated  to
either consumption or labor  income.  Panel D  reports calculations which
take into account some of the details of the corporate sector in Pakistan.
22% of total corporate tax collections in Pakistan are derived from state-
owned enterprises and, therefore, this portion of the tax is removed in the
incidence  calculation.  Another  5%  of the  tax  take comes  from  foreign
enterprises  having  access  to  some  form  of  foreign  tax  credit  against
Pakistan  tax  liabilities,  this  portion  is omitted  from  the  incidence
calculation.  Remaining taxes are allocated to capital income in general.
An  overall  progressive  incidence  of  the  corporate tax, but with  lower
effective tax rates is obtained.
XI.  Some Policy Implications
It should be clear from the discussion above, that our criticisms
of existing  developing country tax  incidence analyses are wide  ranging.
Interactions  with the features central to developing country policy regimes
need to be taken into account in such work, and, furthermore, the
underlying incidence literature on developed countries on which so much of
it is based is itself increasingly coming under challenge.  Our belief is
that existing incidence views are likely to be reversed and quantitative- 44 -
orders of magnitude  substantially changed if more  appropriate approaches
were followed.  In short, existing developing country tax incidence studies
may well contain little useful information.
At  the  same  time,  implementing  new  .pproaches of  the  form we
suggest is not easy.  New models of developing country economies capturing
how control regimes work  are needed, data is a major  (and in some areas
possibly an insurmountable) problem, and no single uniform approach for all
countries makes sense.  While this may well seem overly negative, there are
nonetheless more positive implications  of our discussion  worth emphasizing.
First, it seems clear, to us at least, that in this area, more
explicit  rather  than  implicit  modelling  would  be  helpful  in  future
research.  Agonizing over forward or backward shifting for this or that tax
may  be  less helpful than writing down an explicit model in which the full
implications of assumptions can be traced through.  This we would  see as
eventually  moving  towards  numerical  general  equilibrium  tax modelling,
similar to that now being done for developed countries, but with  central
developing country features captured  (or at  least those  relevant to the
country in question).
Second, even without  new  quantitative analysis, it  seems to us
that the discussion above challenges how one approaches developing country
tax incidence questions relevant to World Bank operations, and, hence, what
may need to be taken into account in lending decisions.  Even though we
argue that there are pitfalls with the incidence analyses for developing
countries,  and  that  it may  be  impossible to  accurately state what  the
incidence of a  particular tax i3,  our analysis does seem to us to shed new
light on a whole series of developing country tax incidence questions which
need  to  be understood  in the  institutionally richer  framework which  we- 45 -
suggest  (see Table  10).  We  would  suggest that  it is the  challenge to
conventional thinking which our analysis implies, rather than the precise
answers from particular  incidence calculations which may  prove  important
for tax policy evaluation for developing countries in the longer run .
For  instance,  discussion  of  taxation  of  agricultural  incomes
(which is a  politically sensitive subject in many  developing countries)
needs to take into account the extent to which tax burdens can be spread to
non-agricultural sectors through interactions with price controls and the
black market activities  we emphasize earlier in the paper.  Also, incidence
effects of the value-added tax are clearly affected by price and quantity
controls through the trade component, as we emphasize above.  Traditional
analysis of incidence effects of the VAT treats the VAT as equivalent to a
sales tax.  The  sales tax,  in  turn, is conventionally thought of  as a
regressive tax in developing countries, because this has been the consensus
view in developed countries for so many years (even though this is chaneing
for the reasons discussed above).  Once the presence of quantity controls
through import licensing are taken into account, then an effect of a VAT
may  simply be  to take away  rents from recipients of quota,  through the
trade component of the VAT.  And if these are weal'i-lier  individuals, then
this can have a significant  progressive incidence impact.
Similar issues arise with  discussions of the tax mix  in various
countries.  For instance, there is an on-going debate in Brazil as to the
appropriate  balance  between  the payroll  tax  and  the  value-added  tax.
Payroll  taxes  in  Brazil  are  a combination  of  a  series  of  individual
contributions components, whose combined effect is substantial, perhaps in
the order of 25 to 30 percent in the manufacturing sector.  There has been
discussion in Brazil as to whether this form of tax erodes international- 46 -
competitiveness  and,  therefore,  heavier  reliance  on  the  VAT  would  be
better.  If evaluated within  a developing country context, payroll taxes
and  VAT will  each have  different  incidence effects than when  evaluated
using traditional developed country approaches.  Thus,  if the payroll tax
largely applies to the manufacturing sector, some of the tax will be borne
by  labor in the agricultural sector as well  as the manufacturing  sector
through the impact on the migration process.  If the VAT is collected on
products  consumed in both  the rural and urban areas,  this will  tend  to
weaken  these  effects.  These  considerations  would  be  missing  if  a
conventional  developed  country  incidence  approach  was  taken  to  the
incidence analysis of tax mix issues.
The  differences  between  tax  incidence  analysis  capturing
developing  country  features  and  those  based  on  conventional  developed
country  analysis can also be  seen by considering what  one might  term a
stylized Bank/Fund package of tax reforms.  We would  see such reforms as
comprising  four main  components.  The  first  is a  general move  towards
reduction of trade taxes and trade liberalization in general.  The second
is  an  emphasis  towards  production  or  consumption  taxes,  particularly
through the value-added  tax.  The third  is a movement  towards reducing
personal tax rates and consolidating the number of brackets.  The fourth
are moves to encourage reductions in corporate tax rates, and also grant
tax incentives to inward foreign investment.
A traditional analysis of the incidence effects of such a  package
would be along the following lines.  Reductions in personal tax rates would
tend  to be  somewhat  regressive,  and  if the  corporate  tax  is borne  by
capital  and  capital  is  more  heavily  owned  by  higher  income  groups,
reductions in corporate taxes would also tend to be  regressive.  Value-- 47 -
added taxes are indirect taxes of a consumption type, and an increase in
them also tends to be regressive.  This whole  package, therefore, would
tend to be seen as a move towards a more regressive tax regime, a feature
about which there could be substantial agonizing in policy making.
Under the alternative view of the world which emerges from this
paper, it seems to us equally defensible to suggest that the value-added
tax  is  a  progressive  rather  than  a  regressive  tax,  that  significant
portions of the corporate tax in various countries are borne by  foreign
treasuries  rather  than  borne  by  domestic  capital,  that  reductions  in
personal  taxes  can  have  substantial  incidence  effects  in  the opposite
direction  because  of  the  weakening  in  problems  of  evasion  and
administration, ultimately reducing transfers through a system of bribery
and corruption to high-income groups.  Thus, the incidence effects of each
one of these taxes could well be quite opposite to the conventional wisdom
asserted repeatedly in policy statements on possible incidence effects of
such tax changes.  Table 10 sets out the differences between conventional
developed country incidence analysis and the views emerging here.
In conclusion, our discussion of developing country tax incidence
literature emphasizes the difficulties associated with  the implementation
of alternative models and approaches, and the inconclusiveness of current
tax incidence calculations.  This may appear overly negative but we also
emphasize  the  challenge  our  discussion  seems  to  suggest  for  existing
perceptions which permeate policy in this area.  Taking these challenges
further in  more refined model based empirical calculations would  seem to
be the task for future  work.25- 48 -
Table 10
ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF THE INCIDENCE OF TAXES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Tax Measure.  Implications of  Implications of the 'Ne-'
Traditional Developed  View, Capturing Develop-
Country Analysis  ing Country Non-Tax
Policy Features
Income Tax  Progressive  Ambiguous
Corporate Tax  Progressive or  Progressive
Proportional
Broad Based Sales Tax
(VAT)  Regressive  Progressive
Trade Taxes  Regressive  Progressive
Payroll Tax  Ambiguous  Ambiguous/Progressive
Urban Property Tax  Regressive/Progressive  Progressive- 49 -
NOTES
1/  Most of the tax incidence literature on developing countries follows
this tradition.  Examples of recent studies include Malik and Saqib
(1989) and Jayasundera (1986).  For surveys of this literature see,
for instance,  Bird and de Wulf  (1973), de Wulf  (1975) and McLure
(1977).
2/  See,  for  instance,  Gillespie  (1980),  Pechman  and  Okner  (1974),
Muegrave, Case and Leonard  (1974)  and Browning (1978).
3/  This is the case with the conventional treatment of sales and excise
taxes.  A number of quantitatively less important uses side effects
also occur, such as with excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco.
4/  See Davies, St. Hilaire and Whalley (1984).
5/  The main  difference in the income concept relative to Pechman and
Okner is what  is included in transfers.  This is discussed in more
detail in Meerman (1980).
6/  A set of lifetime tax incidence calculations for Canada has recently
been produced by Davies, St.-Hilaire and Whalley (1984),  which, while
not  without  problems,  is nonetheless  relevant to  the discussions
here.  These calculations use a simulation  model of life-cycle saving
and  bequest  behavior  for  a  representative  sample  of  Canadian
households to generate some of the distributive series required in an
incidence calculation.  As in the annual incidence calculations, each
component of the tax system is allocated to households, now grouped
by  lifetime  rather than  annual income, and  different distributive
series are used relative to annual incidence calculations.  The main
implications  from  the  DSW  calculations  is  that  there  may  be  a
stronger  basis  than  from  annual  incidence  calculations  for  the
conclusion that  the incidence of  the overall tax system is mildly
progressive.  On the other hand, since inequality over the lifetime
appears to be considerably smaller than in annual data, there seem to
be less grounds for conc,rn that the tax system does not do more to
redistribute income, especially if the social costs of redistribution
through induced inefficiencies are high.
7/  Chaudry-Shah  (1989)  advocates  empirical  analysis  of  capitalized
burdens of the local property tax as an alternate approach to study
property tax incidence.  This (capitalization)  approach represents a
major  departure  from  the  traditional  reasonable  assumptions
approaches to the study of the fiscal incidence of the local  public
sector.
8/  However, an argument by Ballentine (1981)  complicates the implication
that  forward-shifting produces regressive incidence  impacts, as  in
the Pechman-Okner and Gillespie calculations.  Since forward-shifted
taxes  fall  on capital  goods  as  well  as consumption  goods,  savers  bear
some of the burden of forward-shifted taxes.  In Ballentine's study,
around 26 percent of forward-shifted  taxes are borne by savers, which
significantly reduces the regressivity of the tax system calculated
under forward-shifting assumptions.- 50  -
9!  This tax rate is calculated on a net of tax basis; i.e., a 100% tax
rate on net of tax  income equal a 5OC tac rate on a gross basis.
.C:  For  the popular incidence hypothesis (that prices are raised exactly
by the amount of the tax) to be true, the supply of all commodities
must  be  infinitely elastic.  However,  the condition of  infinitely
elasti'.  supply for all commodities could not possibly be satisfied in
any real world economy ir.  the short run and possibly in the long run
because  resource  constraints  would  become  birnding  prior  to  the
satisfaction of  this condition.  Most incidence stueies also assume
that  factors  of production  are  in fixed  supply in  the  short run
without recognizing its inconsistency with  the "infinite elasticity
of  supply"  assumption.  In  most  developing  countries  both  the
domestic  and  foreign  produced goods  are almost  always  in  limited
supply.  This scarcity is often the direct result of price controls,
rationing  of  fore4gn  exchange,  import  licensing  and quantitative
restrictions  on  imported  raw  materials  and  firnished  goods.  The
limited  supply  of  commodities  and  rationing  of  some  of  these
commodities  create  strong  incentives for black market  activities.
Under such conditions, abnormal profits are earned by importers and
local producers of relatively scarce commodities and therefore, any
increase in indirect taxes could be borne out of these profits (see
Prest 1985).
i=1  See  the  discussio.,  of  the  tax  like effects of  these elements  of
developing country trade regimes in Whalley (1989)
12/  See the modelling of black markets in Nguyen and Whalley (1985).
13,  See the calculations for Pakistan by  Jeetun (1978a), for  instance.
14/  See the discussion of trade effects of fcreign exchange rationing in
Clarete and Whalley (1986).
15/  Such schemes are still common in Africa, and can be found in Latin
American countries currentlv experienciTng  import compressicn, such as
Argentina.
16i  See the modelling  analysis of  the situation 4n the Philippines by
Clarete and Whalley  (1988) whose model  results clearly demonstrate
this  point.
17!  A referee has argued that rather than black and white markets facing
the same effective price in equilibrium, there may be rents in the
latter that accrue to the privileged consumers.
18:  Several official and academic publications report anecdotal evidence
on  the  extent  of  black  markets  and  price  controls  in developing
countries.  For example, the Government of Pakistan estimates "black
wealth"  at  180  billion  rupees  or  61%  of  GDP  in  1984-85  (see
Government of Pakistan, National Tax Reform Commission Report, 1987,
p.  104).  Official  estimates of black  income in India  range  from
14.42 to 48.8% of GNP for various years  (see Government of India,
Ministry  of  Finance,  1985.  See  also Chugh  and Uppal  (1986) and- 51  -
Chopra  (1985).  Mohammad  and Whalley  (1984,  1985)  estimate  the
economic loss due to rent seeking in India in the order of 30 to A5Z
of  GNP.  Black-white market differentials in  the foreign exchange
market  can  also  be  substantial.  For  example,  in Brazil  and  nu
Uganda,  in December  1989, the black market premia  in the exchange
market was over 200% (see  also Pinto, 1988).
19/  There  is  a  substantial  body  of  literature  providing  anecdotal
evidence on the extent of tax evasion and bureaucratic corruption ' n
developing countries  (see e.g. Gould and Amaro-Reyes,  1983, Carino,
1986,  Klitgaard,  1988).  A  few examples are  reported here.  For
example, a confidential survey of chartered accountants carried out
in  India  reported  that  76% of  the  income  tax  officers  accepted
bribes.  Furthermore, 68% of their clients paid an average bribe of
20% of  the extra  tax demanded  (see Gang et al.  1989, p. 2).  The
Government  of  India  (1985,  p.  363)  reports  that  less  than  30
convictions  result  from  about  4.5  million  tax  returns  filed.
Similarly, in Malaysia only 2 percent of the more  than 20 thousand
corruption cases  investigated were convicted  (see Gould and Amaro-
Reyes, 1983).  The Pakistan National Tax Reform Commissioner (1987,
pp. 103-104) estimates that 72.4% of the income liable to tax escaped
taxation  in  1984-85.  It  is estimated  that  in  Thailand  47%  of
revenues are lost through corruption and tax evasion (Carino, 1996,
p. 53).
20/  See the extensive discussion of these issues in Grosh (1986).  Heady
(1987) and Heady and Mitra (1987) also consider rural-urban  migration
in optimal tax models.
21/  See Imam ard Whalley (1985).
22/  See WhalJey and Ziderman (1939) where this same point is made,
Imam and Whalley  (1985)  where incidence analyses of minimum wages  n
a two-sector Harris-Todaro framework are presented.  Current ref_rm
debates  on  payroll  taxes  in  Brazil  within  the  Bank  have  alsc
confronted these same issues as to how far tax burdens are dispersed
through the effects to the rural sector.
23/  Auerbach (1990) discusses these issues in detail.
24/  See the World Bank (1989),  pp. 55-57 for details.
25/  Clarete and Whalley  (1990)  have gone a considerable distance to ">ec
this challenge.  They develop an applied general equilibrium mc_el
for Philippines  featuring  tax  and  instutional  distortions.  The
institutional distortions include quantitative import restrictions,
Harris-Todaro  labor market effects and  foreign exchange rationing.
Their model results confirm cone usions reached here.- 52 -
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APPENDIX  A
DATA ON REVENUE SOURCES BY TYPE OF COUNTRY
Source:  (i)  International  Monetary  Fund, Government Finance Yearbook,
various  issues.
(ii)  The World  Bank,  The  Bank  Economic and  Social Data  Base
(BESD).  A computerized data base on developing economies.- 59  -
Tabl.  A.3,  1  ev.In.  Sources  for  Countriee  lele  * S_el  Tee  n  .
Import  Dutes  and  Sc  leas  Prrimer  Source  of  Revenue
Seocel  Eloyere  Dometic  Txes  Cemrel
Totel  Isceme  Securit  Peyroll  tes  em  as  Goods  Can  Soles  latreretomel  Other  matda
11"Gmee  Tee  IndIvidual  Corporate  Contribt  ute  Taees  Propecty  Services  Tases  Trae  teoze  teaxe  Revee
ate.  9"6  1.00  0.13  0.04  0.09  DA  K  0.01  0.35  0.05  0.00  oo  0.40
Burkle.  Feas  too?  1.00  0.21  0.09  0.03  P  0.01  0.03  0.23  0.07  G."  0.03  0.11
urs  19"  3.00  0.06  N  a  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.39  0.34  0.14  0.00  0.40
Sunmedl  l33l  3.00  0.22  0.10  0.11  0.03  0.02  O.6  0.29  N  0.24  0.01  0.11
Central  UAri  asp  3941  1.00  0.11  0.06  0.09  0.01  0.04  0.00  0.21  0.06  0.41  0.04  0.0
Cl_  1957  1.00  0.23  0.34  O.0  0.00  0.03  0.03  0.09  0.03  0.46  0.04  0.32
Ciome  3967  1.00  0.31  0.02  0.09  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.11  0.09  0.54  0.01  0.22
Ebtopia  l6l  3.00  0.25  0.07  0.14  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.22  O.0  0.20  0.01  0.21
Gamble  3967  3.00  0.13  0.05  0.07  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04  K  0.76  0.00  0.02
"twoe  1903  1.00  0.13  oh  KA  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.30  0.00  0.34
nettu  1967  3.00  0.12  0.07  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.42  0.15  0.21  0.0  0.34
Na4deacer  e902  1.00  0.14  O.0  0.12  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.37  0.23  0.20  0.03  0.03
mail  J96l  3.00  0.00  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.01  0.02  0.22  0.17  0.26  0.35  0.10
Nepal  3965  1.00  0.0  0.06  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.41  0.22  0.26  0.00  0.31
N4ir  3o9e  1.00  0.24  0.0  0.16  0.04  0.00  0.03  0.16  0.12  0.36  0.00  0.13
bes"  I96  1.00  0.10  0.01  0.10  0.04  0.00  0.01  0.19  a  0.42  6.03  0.14
s_  el  394"  1.00  0.20  o.33  0.05  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.29  0.2)  0.42  0.03  6.06
Sri  Lanee  1"  3.00  0.32  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.00  0."4  0.37  0.25  0.3  0.00  6.11
T_emmi  3965  3.60  0.25  0.10  0.16  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.57  0.4  0.0e  0.02  6.65
fp.  390I  3.00  0.310  0.07  0.21  0.0"  0.00  0.0  0.06  0.05  0.32  0.60  0.22
Veetu.  it"  I3.00  0.00  o  KA  0.00  0.00  0.0  0.23  *0.03  0.51  0.00  0.39
SAr.  3It"  3.60  0.30  0.35  0.135  0.01  0.03  0.00  0.35  0.16  0.33  0.01.  6.15
*  erge
(bee  taei  1.00  0.17  O."  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.25  0.15  0.34  0.02  0.16
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Table  4.2g  Revenm  Sources  for  Coumtrlee  with  Narrow  Tan aceo
Sut  A Nore  Kzaasaava  Tan  Svote.
Social  "ployers  Dosetic  lae  General
Total  Inco_e  iecuuity  Payroll  Tame  on  - Goods  sod  Sales  Int-rnetional  Other  8gnia&
Revenue  Tax  Individual  Corporate  Cootribution  Tama  Property  Services  fazes  Trade  Tame_  Tame_  Reem
uBahama  I90"  1.00  0.00  MA  MA  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.0  Mo  0.30  O.0"  0.17
Barba,im  1903  1.00  0.30  0.11  0.10  0.00  0.03  0.21  0.13  0.14  0.10  0.10  0."
s311  1905  1.00  0.20  0.14  0.04  0.03  0.00  0.01  0.11  OA  0.40  0.01  0.13
B6.1,1  1904  1.00  0.04  0.04  0.02  0.21  0.00  0.01  0.17  0.04  0.30  0.02  0.21
Cc_r_  197  1.00  0.31  0.09  0.22  0.05  0.00  0.02  0.15  0.07  0.10  0.02  a  25
CO°.O  1900  1.00  0.39  0.07  0.33  0.04  0.01  0.00  0.04  0.0"  0.10  0.01  0.1
Costa  B1As  903  1.00  0.11.  0.10  0.00  0.25  0.00  0.00  0.20  0.33  0.21  0.01  0.13
Cote  itwelre  1904  1.00  0.11  0.0  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.14  O.0S  0.27  Mo  0.30
Cyprus  1307  1.00  0.21  0.15  0.03  0.17  0.01  0.03  0.10  Io  0.17  0.0  0.19
Djibouti  1904  1.00  014  0.11  00.  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.30  0.29  0.05  0.02  0.07
Demsnican  tep  I0  1.00  0.10  0.07  0.11  0.03  0.00  0.01  0.37  D&  0.32  0.01  0.07
Guatemal  1962  3.00  0.32  0.02  O.1O  0.12  0.00  0.03  0.33  0.21  0.1  0.13  O.1S
GuC e  1003  1.00  0.30  0.10  0.19  0.13  0.00  0.02  0.29  0.21  0.11  0.01  0.13
rmomas  1001  1.00  0.24  0.07  0.17  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.26  0.07  0.42  0.01  0.04
Jama  19  INI  1.00  0.31  0.14  0.13  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.47  0.22  0.03  0.04  0.03
Lsetoh  19s0  1.00  0.11  0.04  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.10  O."  0.0  0.00  0.11
Llboe  3975  1.00  0.34  0.20  0.0  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.32  0.03  0.27  0.01  0.04
"alta  3t0  1.00  0.25  0.13  0.11  0.17  0.00  0.02  0.04  M  0.21  0.00  0.2
Nm.rUint  1907  1.00  0.10  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.00  0.04  0.10  0.07  0.  3  0.00  0.13
Morocco  i1"  1.00  0.19  0.10  0.04  0.03  0.00  0.03  0.4o  0.24  0.14  0.03  0.00
O*earauca  It"  1.00  0.14  NA  NA  0.10  0.00  0.03  0.40  6.0o  0.07  0.01  0.00
as"m13907  1.00  0.21  Mo  0.21  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  Mo  0.02  0.00  0.75
PerJamay  106  1.00  0.12  Ko  0.12  0.13  0.01  0.0.  0.2U  0.06  0.11  0.11  0.13
St.  Cbrlatopber  1905  1.00  0.10  0.00  0.10  0.11  0.00  0.01  0.22  0.1  0.26  0.03  0.24
St.  Lucla  1903  1.00  0.20  NA  No  0.05  0.00  0.01  0.10  0.13  0.34  0.01  0.14
Surloses  Its  1.00  0.35  0.21  0.14  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.0"  0.00  0.23  0.03  0.14
Syria  190  1.00  0.25  0.00  0.24  0.00  0.03  0.04  0."9  0.01  0.07  0.05  0.47
Tunisia  3944  1.00  0.12  0.06  0  04  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.20  0.04  0.25  0.01  0.24
lease  3967  1.00  0.13  0.08  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.13  la  0.29  0.14  0.29
11abab.s  1965  1.00  0.42  0.26  0.1O  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.30  0.19  0.16  0.01  0.10
(Uwe bt.d)  1.00  0.20  0.10  0.11  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.22  0.12  0.24  0.03  0.19- 61  -
Table  4.3i  Revenue  Source.  for  Countrile  with  USde.ure.d  fag  Systes.
and  Large  Stlae  Tse  lumolee
Soial  1ep1eyre  bomesttc  fane  Gemlrel Tetal  lecoma  Secrity  Payrell  Taxes an  em Goode aN  Bales  Iteratleml  Other  swam Sevtro  Tea  Individual  Corporete  Coentibut  le  . Taxes  Property  Services  Tazes  Trade  fazes  Tazes  sev
£rge.tina  3964  1.00  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.24  e.00  o.0s  0.43  0.32  0.33  0.0o  0.10 Brasil  396"  3.00  0.21  0.03  0.01  0.26  0.05  0.00  0.20  0.03  6.02  0.60  0.23 Chtle  1U7  I.00  0.14  0.04  0.10  0.01  0.00  0.03  0.42  0.33  0.10  0.04  0.20 Colembla  Its?  1.00  0.21  0.33  0.34  0.06  0.04  0.00  0.21  0.22  0.19  0.02  0.11 Egypt  too?  3.00  0.14  0.03  0.13  0.33  0.00  0.03  0.33  IV  0.12  o.0  0.34 Gabon  1365  I.00  0.41  0.03  0.40  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.05  0.15  0.00  0.32 Gceec  3loss  3.00  0.36  0.13  0.03  0.35  0.00  0.02  0.34  0.19  0.01  0.04  0.10 India  1ts6  3.00  0.34  0.06  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.31  0.03  0.24  0.00  0.20 todoeneia  3661  3.00  0.46  0.03  0.43  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.36  0.14  0.06  0.00  0.24 Iran  1666  1.00  0.23  0.03  0.39  0.34  0.03  0.03  0.31  0.01  0.12  0.00  0.33 Malaysta  1ts?  3.00  0.34  0.10  0.24  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.19  0.04  0.11  0.02  0.21 Nestco  1307  3.00  0.21  0.12  0.13  0.09  0.01  0.00  0.41  VA  0.0  0.00  0.00 Pehitan  3966  1.00  0.13  NA  MA  0.00  0.00  0e00  0.33  0.01  0.33  0.00  0.23 P  1964  I.00  0.23  MA  NA  0.19  0.00  0.02  0.13  0.0  0.12  0.02  0.26 Portugal  064  1.00  0.24  0.09  0.0  0.22  0.02  0.02  0.33  0.33  0.03  0.04  00 Thalland  1396  1.00  0.13  0.09  0.09  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.0  e.14  6.20  0.01  0.30 trinidad  A Tebago  1963  1.00  0.10  0.12  0.55  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.02  O.04  0.00  0.31 Tuhrkey  it9  1.00  0.42  0.30  0.13  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.33  0.30  6.01  0.04  0.33 Urugua  1066  1.00  0.06  0.03  0.04  0.27  0.03  0.04  0.43  0.23  0.34  0.03  0.61 Veneguele  3963  3.00  0.43  0.04  0.39  0.04  0.03  0.01  0.00  000.23  0.00  0.36
(0,.eat-dl  3.00  0.26  0.01  0.16  0.11  0.01  0.03  6.26  0.11  0.13  0.02  0.19 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Tabl*  A.4m  Revenue  Source,  for  Countries  witb  Nature  and  Ad&nced  TaS  Sleteme
Social  Zeployere  D<ette  Taens  General
Tatel  Iacome  Security  Payroll  Taxes  on  on  Good  and  Sales  lnterxtronal  Other  NaTaz
la.s  Ton  Individual  Corporate  Contributions  Taxs  Property  Services  Tae  Trade  ee.  Taxes  re.nue
&WrY  19o7  1.00  0.1  0.01  0.17  0.24  0.04  0.03  0.31  0.09  0.05  0.04  0.09
Ierael  1966  1.00  0.31  0.  24  0.07  0. 06  0.03  0.01  0.30  0.27  0.05  0.00  0.19
core,  1947  1.00  0.20  0.15  0.13  0.02  0.00  0.01  0.39  0.20  0.17  0.02  0.o0
Poland  198  1.00  0.26  IIA  0.26  0.21  0.03  0.03  0.30  0. 30  0.01  0.00  D.o"
mn1Ia  1965  1.00  0.00  MA  KA  0.17  0.12  0.00  0.00  NA  0.00  0.00  0.71
Sinapore  1966  1.00  0.15  IA  MA  0.00  0.01  0.0  0.10  NA  0.02  0.03  0.31
Soutb  Atric,  1965  1.00  0.53  0.26  0.24  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.32  0.25  0.03  0.01  0.09
TugoeleviS  9517  1.00  0.00  MA  MA  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.60  0.60  0.36  0.00  0.02
(Iuegbted)  1.00  0.22  0.11  0.1/  0.09  0.03  0.02  0.29  0.2S  0.10  0.01  0.20
------- ___  ----------------------------------------------------------- _  _  __  __  _  __  _  -------- _  _  ----------- _  __  _------  _  ------- _  _-__--------_-__-_-__  __-___-__-_  _-_--____-__-_____  __-__-__  __-______  _-_  _  -_-_____  ___  -_  _  -__  _-__PRE_Workina  Paper Series
Contact
aL,  Author  Law  for paper
WPS443  ire  Inf ation Stabilization  Cycles  Miguel A, Kguel
in Argentina  and  Brazil  Nissan  Liviatan
WPS444  Trio Poi tical Economy of Inflation  Stephan Haggard  June 1  90  A. Oropesa
and StabLiizat  on in Middle Income  Robert Kaufman  391  76
Countr'es
WPS445  Pricirg.  Cost Recovery, and  Rachel E. Kranton  June 1990  W. Wright
Proouction Efficiency in Transport:  33-744
A CritIque
WPS446  MEXAGMKTS:  A Model of Crop  Gerald T. O'Mara  July 1990  C. Spooner
and Livestock Markets in Mexico  Me'ilnda Ingco  30464
WPS447  Analyzing the Effects of U.S.  Gerald T. O'Mara  July 1990  C. Spooner
Agr:cuit  ... ra! Pci.cy on Mexican  30464
Agricultura, Markets Using ,he
MEXAGMKTS  Model
WPS448  A Model o'  U S. Corn, Sorghum.  Richard E. Just  July 1990  C.  Spooner
and Soyoean Markets and the  30464
Ro,e of Governmetr  Progyams
(  USAGMKTS)
WPS449  Analys s cf the  Effects cf LJ  S  Rlch'rd E  Jjst  July '3930  C  Spoone'
Macroeconon'c  Policy or  U S  30464
Aqrcul  +re  Uinrg the  USAGMKFS
Mocec
WPS450  Porto  o E"ec's  of Debt-EqQ !y  Drn ol Oks  June 1990  S  Kwrg-Watson
S  ^rc  a  hd  Debt Excna-iges  31047
W :n Sore  AppcAT  ns to
Lat;n A-er,ca
WPS451  Producl v:ty  l.r-perfect Cnm.r-pet,t,on  Ann E. Harnson  July 1990  S  FalIcr
and Trace  Liberalizat:cn in  38009
the  C5te d'lvoire
WPS452  Moc.e  ."n  l"estmert  Beo,vior  r  Nemat Shaf  k.  June 1990  J  Israe
Deve c,nrg  Coiur-tr  es  An  31285
App cateor to  Egypt
WPS453  Do S!eel Pnces Move Tcget  r-9 Y ng OCan  June 1990  S  Lipscomb
A Coiniegration Test  33718
WPS454  Asset and Lability  Manariement  Toshiya Masuoka  June 1990  S  Bertelsmeier
in the Developing Countr;es:  Modern  33767
Financial Techncues  -- A PrimerPRE  Work,ng  Paper  Series
Contact
Ttle  Author  i  fior 1apatt
WPS455 A Formal  Estimation  of 1 e  LEffect  JLnichi Goro  June 1990  M T  Sanchez
of the MF-A  on Clotn,ng  Lxports  33731
frum I DCs
VW'P'S4  5  Improving  tIi  SUpp  y anr Use  of  S. D. Foster  June 1990  Z  Vania
Esse  nt al Dr(gs irn  S.ib  Saharan  Africa  33664
ViPS-;5,  Flranc "g Hea;th  Services  in Afr,ca  Germarno  Mwabu  June 1990  Z  Vania
An A  o-,sment of Alternative  33664
Approaches
WPS458  Does  Japanese  Direct  Foreign  Kenji  Takeuchi  June 1990  J. Epps
Irvcstment Promote  Japanese  Imports  33710
frorm  Developing  Countries?
WPS459  Policies  for E-..onomic  Deveiopment Stanley  Fischer  June 1990  ViDR Office
Vinod Thomas  31393
WPS460  Does  Food Atd Depress  Food  Victor tavy  July 1990  A. Murphy
Product;on 9 The Disincentive  33750
Dilemma  in the African  Context
WPS461 Labor  Market  Participation,  Returns  Shahidur  R. Khandker  July 1990  B. Smith
to Educatior,  and  Male-Fema  e  35108
Wage D,fferences  n Peru
WPS462 Ar, A!Iernative  View  of Tax  Anwar  Shah  July 1990  A.  Bhalla
Inc,aeince Anakysis  far  Deveioping  John Whailey  37699
Countrie:.